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Johan De Smedt and Helen De Cruz 
Humans have a tendency to reason teleologically. This tendency is more 
pronounced under time pressure, in people with little formal schooling and in 
patients with Alzheimer’s. This has led some cognitive scientists of religion, 
notably Kelemen, to call intuitive teleological reasoning promiscuous, by 
which they mean teleology is applied to domains where it is unwarranted. We 
examine these claims using Kant’s idea of the transcendental illusion in the 
first Critique and his views on the regulative function of teleological 
reasoning in the third Critique.1 We examine whether a Kantian framework 
can help resolve the tension between the apparent promiscuity of intuitive 
teleology and its role in human reasoning about biological organisms and 
natural kinds. 
The cognitive science of religion (CSR) is the multidisciplinary study of the 
cognitive basis of religious beliefs and practices. A basic assumption that 
unites this methodologically and conceptually diverse field is that religion is 
a product of everyday, mundane reasoning processes, and not some special 
domain of human cognition that requires religion-specific explanations. One 
domain CSR authors investigate is teleological thinking. People 
spontaneously adopt a teleological stance in thinking about a wide range of 
events and objects in their environment. For instance, they believe that 
features of the natural environment have a purpose (e.g., clouds are for 
raining), that the anatomical features of animals and plants have a purpose 
(e.g., thorns are there to protect plants from being eaten) and that significant 
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life events happen for a reason (e.g., Jessica thinks she failed her year because 
the universe was telling her she needed to study something else). 
Some CSR authors have argued that humans spontaneously exhibit 
promiscuous teleological thinking, an over-attribution of teleology, beyond 
the domain where such attribution would be appropriate.2 Humans make 
questionable inferences, such as that trees are for generating oxygen, or that 
the purpose of lions is to be displayed in zoos. However, other authors have 
questioned this interpretation.3 In this chapter, we argue that Kant’s views on 
teleological thinking can help throw new light on this debate. In particular, as 
we will show, Kant held that intuitive teleology helps us to make sense of the 
world – and thus is regulative of our cognition – but that it also makes us 
habitually overstep the boundaries of reasoning. 
The first section provides an overview of Kant’s transcendental illusion and 
its relevance for cognitive science today. The second section gives an 
overview of the CSR literature on intuitive teleological thinking. The third 
section looks into possible problems for the promiscuous teleology hypothesis 
and provides alternative explanations: we propose that while teleological 
reasoning is salient and tenacious across a wide variety of age groups and 
cultures, it can be flexibly deployed depending on the availability of 
alternative explanations and the extent to which someone deems teleology 
appropriate. The fourth section looks in detail at Kant’s discussion of 
teleology in the third Critique, and his evaluation of the design argument. The 
fifth section shows that Kant’s transcendental illusion can help make sense of 
an intuitive teleology which on the one hand helps regulate our cognition (a 
positive role), but at the same time generates questionable inferences (a 
negative role). 
Kant’s transcendental illusion and its relevance for cognitive science 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant proposed a comprehensive metaphysics 
and philosophy of mind that still has relevance for cognitive scientists today. 
His distinctive contribution to the rationalism-empiricism debate was to argue 
that the mind structures our experiences. While some of Kant’s proposals 
would be considered strange by cognitive scientists (e.g., he believed space 
and time were impositions of the mind, not inherent features of the world), his 
broad idea that the mind structures experience is now accepted, which makes 
it hard to appreciate how innovative it was in the eighteenth century. 
According to Kant, the mind actively shapes and structures experience by 
several co-operating faculties of the mind, in particular, sensibility and 
understanding. Everything we experience has a priori elements, that is, 
elements that our reason supplies, prior to experience. 
While this contribution to our current understanding of how the mind works 
is well known among cognitive scientists, a second feature of his work has 
received relatively little attention in the contemporary study of the human 
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mind. This concerns the limits of reasoning, of metaphysical reasoning in 
particular. Indeed, the Critique of Pure Reason is more a systematic probing 
of the limits of the human mind than of its powers. Unlike rationalists, Kant 
did not think that we could obtain any knowledge of the world merely through 
reasoning alone. Yet we do try to get knowledge of the world by reason alone 
when we engage in metaphysical speculations, for instance, about the 
existence of mathematical objects outside of space-time. This gives rise to a 
problem: our metaphysical ruminations are fruitless. 
In the A and B Prefaces of the first Critique, Kant considered the state of 
metaphysics. Metaphysics, the philosophical inquiry about ultimate reality, 
was supposed to be the queen of sciences, providing a comprehensive picture 
of the world. Yet Kant clearly saw that while natural philosophers (who now 
would be called scientists) were making progress, metaphysicians seemed to 
be stuck in a rut. Rationalists such as Descartes thought it was possible to use 
one’s reason and in this way to arrive at knowledge about God, the soul and 
the universe, ideas that are outside of our experience. Kant disagreed: this is 
an illicit use of reason as there are inherent limits to our knowledge (which he 
detailed in the Analytic): we can learn about the world of our experience, and 
about the categories, high-level templates that are a priori and that we need to 
make sense of our experiences. But we tend to overstep these limitations, 
when we use principles such as causation, which are outside our experience. 
Kant bemoaned this tendency: ‘[Reason] begins from principles whose use is 
unavoidable in the course of experience and at the same time sufficiently 
warranted by it. With these principles it rises … ever higher, to more remote 
conditions.’4 For example, the idea that everything has a cause for its existence 
may accord with our everyday experience, but it is a mistake to apply this to 
the universe as a whole, as cosmological arguments do. 
We look for ultimate explanations which gives rise to a specific reasoning 
error, the transcendental illusion. The transcendental illusion occurs when we 
‘take a subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts … for an objective 
necessity in the determination of things in themselves’.5 As Grier summarises, 
this tendency of human reasoning, the transcendental illusion happens when 
we ‘take subjective demands for unification of thought to be objective 
characteristics of things’.6 For example, we tend to conceptualise events in 
terms of cause and effect, but for Kant, it would be a mistake to infer from this 
cognitive tendency that causation is an actual feature of the world. 
The transcendental illusion is not an easily avoidable error. Simply thinking 
more deeply won’t solve it. Rather, the illusion is a result of the way our 
reasoning is structured. Kant repeatedly drew an analogy between the 
transcendental illusion and optical illusions; for example, the moon appears 
larger when it is rising than when it is high up in the sky, even to an astronomer 
who is not deceived by this optical illusion.7 In this, Kant prefigures some 
contemporary work in cognitive science about cognitive biases that persist in 
spite of education and reflection. For example, even highly educated people 
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erroneously maintain they are less biased than others.8 Part of Kant’s overall 
project is thus to uncover the illusion in transcendental judgments while 
protecting us from being deceived by it, but it can never bring it about that 
transcendental illusion (like logical illusion) should ever disappear and cease 
to be an illusion. What we have here is natural and unavoidable illusion.9 
Kant’s position on the transcendental illusion is subtle, as he holds the 
following claims, which are in tension, albeit not contradictory. First, the 
transcendental illusion is the result of reasoning in an improper way. Our 
knowledge has to be limited to experience, and cannot go beyond it. Second, 
the transcendental illusion also plays a positive role. It helps us to regulate our 
cognition. As we will see further on, Kant’s Critique of Judgment provides an 
in-depth exploration of teleological reasoning as a heuristic device. We 
conceptualise biological organisms (animals and plants) as having natural 
purposes (Naturzweck). Although they are not products of design, they 
nevertheless have features similar to artefacts, for example, they have parts 
that are in dependence relations, such as the leaves and trunk of a tree: ‘The 
leaves, too, though produced by the tree, also sustain it in turn; for repeated 
defoliation would kill it, and its growth depends on their effect on the trunk.’10 
On the other hand, they are unlike artefacts in that they produce offspring 
looking like themselves, ‘one gear in the watch does not produce another; still 
less does one watch produce other watches’.11 Kant found himself in the 
peculiar position of finding fault with arguments such as the design argument 
and the cosmological argument, and at the same time holding that the 
reasoning that underlies these arguments is irresistible given the way our 
minds are structured. 
Contemporary cognitive science has hardly paid attention to Kant’s second 
bugbear, the limits of reason and how these lead us to making unwarranted 
metaphysical claims. However, there is one notable exception, the cognitive 
science of religion. CSR investigates the cognitive biases underlying religious 
belief formation. CSR authors have argued that religious beliefs are 
underpinned by ordinary inference systems that we use in everyday forms of 
reasoning. For example, our belief in an immaterial soul may be the result of 
ordinary reasoning processes that are involved when we think about other 
people and their mental states. When one makes inferences about, say, what 
one’s grandfather would want or do, his nearby physical presence is not 
required. After grandfather’s death, our intuitive psychology continues to 
generate inferences about what he would have wanted, which makes the idea 
of a continued existence of his mental states, separate from his body, plausible. 
This spontaneous thinking about dead people’s mental states does not yet 
amount to a fully-fledged set of afterlife beliefs, which tend to include 
reincarnation or reward/punishment after death, but they make such beliefs 
plausible, and thus more likely to be culturally transmitted.12 
The same may be true of teleology. While intuitive teleological thinking 
may have originated in reasoning about living things and artefacts, it may have 
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facilitated the generation and transmission of religious beliefs, including 
belief in fate and in creationism. In the next section, we provide a brief 
overview of the CSR literature on teleology. 
Thinking teleologically 
Young children and adults exhibit a tendency to think about objects and events 
as for a purpose. Research on teleological thinking has focused on significant 
life events and on features of the natural world. We here provide a review of 
this evidence, focusing on people’s belief that things happen for a reason, and 
on their belief that natural kinds are created for a purpose. Both of these 
tendencies are often labelled ‘promiscuous teleology’, the tendency to over-
attribute purpose. We show that teleological thinking is tenacious, although it 
can be subdued by education. The next section reviews some objections to 
promiscuous teleology. 
People often attribute purpose to significant life events, both negative and 
positive, as if things happen for a reason, for example, they might attribute 
meeting their future partner by being seated next to them on a transatlantic 
flight as happening for a reason – they were seated together so they would 
meet and fall in love. Or, they might interpret a serious illness as a way to help 
them realise what truly matters to them. Such teleological causes are often 
attributed to supernatural agents or non-agential forces, such as karma or the 
universe. People realise there are non-teleological natural causes involved as 
well – the seating arrangement on the plane, or the genetic or environmental 
causes of illness. Cross-culturally this joint appeal to non-teleological natural 
and teleological supernatural causes happens frequently. South Africans 
explain AIDS individuals in particular as a result of supernatural agency, such 
as a curse by a witch, and naturalistic causes, in this case, infection with HIV.13 
Likewise, the Azande, an African small-scale society, know that termites are 
the natural cause for why granaries collapse, but in order to explain why this 
granary and not some other does so, and why it collapsed on that person, they 
appeal to purposeful agency, in particular witchcraft: 
The Zande knows that the supports were undermined by termites and that 
people were sitting beneath the granary in order to escape the heat and 
glare of the sun. But he knows besides why these two events occurred at 
a precisely similar moment in time and space. It was due to the action of 
witchcraft.14 
Across cultures, people tend to regard supernatural explanations and material 
explanations as complementary rather than competing. While explicitly 
supernatural explanations emerge only in older children, probably as a result 
of cultural socialisation, five-year-olds already teleologically explain 
significant life events, for example, they happen so as ‘to teach a lesson’ or to 
‘send a sign’.15 This indicates that teleological thinking about life events is an 
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early-developed tendency, later mediated by culturally transmitted belief 
systems, be they religious or non-religious. 
Several studies have probed the relationship between religious beliefs and 
teleological explanations for life events in adults. Committed theists offer 
more teleological explanations for significant life events they encountered 
compared to committed atheists.16 However, about a quarter of atheist 
participants do appeal to fate or the universe to explain such events, for 
example, ‘I think this occurred as a way for the universe to show me that no 
matter what I thought my mission in life was, I was meant to be a person who 
lived my life for others and strives to make everything around me a little better 
and more kind and loving’.17 Likewise, people, regardless of religious belief, 
give teleological explanations for life events, including half of the atheists, 
and three quarters of the theist participants.18 
Taken together, this research indicates an enduring tendency to think 
teleologically about life events. It remains unclear, however, what cognitive 
capacities might underlie this tendency. Heywood and Bering speculate that 
teleological thinking is the application of ordinary social reasoning processes 
(where we might think that people do things for a reason) to life events. In 
other words, the way we think about people’s motivations is extended to non-
agential entities such as the universe.19 However, findings about the 
relationship between mentalising and teleological thinking have been mixed: 
people who are better at social reasoning do not necessarily attribute more 
agency to fate or the universe, which one would expect if social reasoning lies 
at the basis of attributing teleology to life events.20 
Kelemen argues that children and adults spontaneously exhibit a tendency 
to believe that objects, including natural objects such as clouds, trees or 
mountains, serve a purpose.21 She terms this tendency ‘promiscuous 
teleology’, and contrasts it with ‘selective teleology’. Selective teleology is 
the ability to use teleological reasoning in domains where this is appropriate.22 
These domains include artefacts and anatomical adaptations. For example, 
chairs are for sitting on and molars are for chewing with. Kelemen argues that 
people overextend teleology beyond artefacts and anatomical adaptations, 
hence ‘promiscuous teleology’.23 
In an early experiment that probed participants’ teleological tendencies, 
children were presented with a particular object, such as a tiger. They were 
then offered two possible accounts for why the object is there. One was 
teleological: tigers are made for walking, for going in the zoo. The other was 
non-teleological: tigers are not ‘for’ anything, they just are. Children had to 
indicate which explanation they found more plausible. They tend to endorse 
teleological explanations for whole biological entities (e.g., tigers) more than 
adults do, whereas their endorsement for teleological explanations for 
artefacts are similar to adults. The two kinds of accounts in this experiment 
are not equivalent: one is an explanation, the other is not. Later studies have 
pitted teleological against non-teleological explanations for why objects such 
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as rocks and clouds exist. Some teleological functional explanations were self-
serving, for example, ‘the rocks were pointy so that animals wouldn’t sit on 
them and smash them’, whereas others were other-serving, for example, ‘the 
rocks were pointy so that animals could scratch on them when they got itchy’. 
Non-teleological explanations appealed to causal processes, for example, 
‘rocks were pointy because bits of stuff piled up on top of one another for a 
long time’. Kelemen found that while American adults endorsed teleological 
explanations selectively for biological parts (e.g., the length of a giraffe’s 
neck), children of six and seven years old applied it indiscriminately, using it 
also for non-biological natural kinds, such as rocks, mountains and clouds. 
Moreover, British and American schoolchildren do not differ in their tendency 
to assign purpose to whole objects and organisms.24 Because the teleological 
stance is not specific to artefacts, but applies to a variety of objects, including 
natural kinds and (parts of) biological organisms, it is dubbed ‘promiscuous 
teleology’. 
In order to establish that teleological thinking is a deep-seated human 
tendency, one would have to show that it occurs cross-culturally. There have 
as yet not been any systematic studies that compare teleological thinking 
across cultures. However, there are some studies indicating that the tendency 
to overattribute teleology is not just present in western cultures, but also in 
China and Latin America. Rottman et al. investigated teleological thinking in 
Chinese adults, both under speeded and unspeeded conditions, that is, in 
conditions where one is put under time pressure versus those where 
participants can take their time.25 Chinese adults tend to be low in religiosity, 
due to decades of state-encouraged atheism. Given the connection between 
theism and some forms of teleological thinking (in particular, about life 
events), this is a relevant population to test whether intuitive teleological 
thinking about objects is also present in a low-religiosity population. Chinese 
participants endorsed promiscuous teleological explanations, for example, 
they tend to endorse teleological explanations such as ‘the earth has an ozone 
layer to protect it from UV radiation,’ and this tendency increased when they 
were put under time pressure. 
Western education can decrease the tendency to reason teleologically. One 
clue to the role of education in teleological thinking is the observation that 
adults offer fewer teleological explanations compared with children. One 
experiment examined the effects of Western formal schooling by looking at 
teleological reasoning in Romani adults who had attended school, and those 
who had not. Romani value practical skills and cultural traditions of their 
communities, which is why only a third of Romani primary school-age 
children are regularly enrolled in school in Romania. Romani adults with 
varying degrees of school exposure were presented with explanations for a 
wide range of phenomena, for example, sand might be grainy because ‘bits of 
shells got broken up and mixed in making it that way’ (mechanistic) or ‘so 
that it wouldn’t get blown away and scattered by the wind’ (teleological).26 
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The tendency to endorse teleological explanations for non-biological natural 
kinds (such as sand) decreased with the number of years of schooling. 
Secondary and tertiary education continue to decrease the endorsement of 
teleological explanations. Kelemen et al. compared to what extent people with 
different levels of education endorsed faulty teleological explanations such as 
‘germs mutate in order to become drug resistant’.27 Participants included 
undergraduates, people from the greater Boston area (typically with a 
bachelor’s degree) and holders of PhDs in either STEM subjects or humanities 
who are active scholars. Having a PhD further decreased teleological 
tendencies, regardless of whether it was in STEM or in the humanities. 
More indirect evidence for the mitigating role of education was found in 
adults who were given teleological and non-teleological true-and-false 
explanations. Under speeded conditions, undergraduate students were more 
prone to endorse false teleological explanations (e.g., ‘the sun radiates heat 
because warmth nurtures life’), but not false mechanistic explanations (e.g., 
‘hills form because floodwater freezes’).28 Adults with Alzheimer’s show an 
increased tendency to endorse teleological explanations, for example, older 
adults without Alzheimer’s tend to endorse that rain exists ‘because water 
condenses into clouds and forms droplets’, whereas Alzheimer’s patients 
think rain exists ‘so that plants and animals have water for drinking and 
growing’, probably because Alzheimer’s diminishes access to mechanistic 
explanations, the kind of explanations we acquire during education. Taken 
together, these studies suggest that teleological thinking is a cognitive default 
that we turn to in the absence of other explanations. 
Critiques of promiscuous teleology 
While evidence for promiscuous teleology is substantial, the hypothesis faces 
a number of difficulties. It has an epistemic normative flavour: people 
inappropriately extend teleology to domains where physical-causal 
explanations are more appropriate. Elqayam and Evans find this problematic 
since empirical evidence cannot arbitrate between competing normative 
theories.29 At best, empirical evidence can be used to establish a certain 
cognitive tendency, in this case, the tendency to attribute teleology to a wide 
range of domains. This tendency can be gauged only descriptively, yet 
researchers like Kelemen seem to assume that promiscuous teleology is the 
result of a mistake; while it is a natural tendency, it needs to be corrected by 
education. Next to this, some of the causal-mechanistic explanations used in 
these experiments were plainly wrong, for example, ‘rocks were pointy 
because bits of stuff piled up on top of one another for a long time’ is a wrong 
explanation, and yet it is offered as a causal-mechanistic, more appropriate, 
alternative by Kelemen. 
Kelemen realises that some philosophers and biologists hold that we can 
sometimes appropriately use teleological explanations for functional features 
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of organisms.30,31 For example, it would not be a mistake to say that giraffes 
have long necks so that they can eat the leaves that grow high up in trees, or 
so that the males can use their necks in fights with other males. But Kelemen 
insists that intuitive teleology is quite different from these scientific 
explanations: while authors like Neander and Mayr do not see natural 
selection as a process akin to intentional design, laypeople (and especially the 
child participants in her studies) assume that natural objects, including 
biological species, are intentionally designed.32 Still, labelling this unlearned 
teleological thinking as promiscuous requires a substantial metaphysical 
assumption on the part of cognitive scientists, namely that there is no teleology 
in nature, except for local teleology at the functional level (which is what 
authors like Neander and Mayr accept). A biologist can rightfully maintain 
that leaves are there to provide energy and oxygen for plants, but this is not 
the same as venturing into Gaia beliefs, such as that the Amazon forest forms 
the lungs of the Earth, providing oxygen for us all. The latter would require 
some explanation of who does the providing (e.g., Gaia, Mother Nature). 
Cognitive scientists have no scientific framework for adjudicating whether 
Gaia and other supernatural teleological beliefs are sound. This falls outside 
of the remit of science, which is methodologically naturalistic. 
Belief in supernatural agency, particularly in an agential nature (Gaia 
beliefs) predicts teleological tendencies in educated adults, including physical 
scientists and humanities scholars.33 In a study in Finland and the US, 
participants were shown photographs of objects (e.g., giraffe, maple tree, 
mountain and paw of a tiger) and were asked if the object was ‘purposefully 
made by some being’.34 The study also included some control objects such as 
a pair of scissors and a cello because these would always have to yield ‘yes’. 
Participants had to respond very quickly yes or no for each of these pictures. 
People who had a higher belief in God, or in the Earth as a purposeful agent 
(Gaia beliefs), had a higher tendency to judge that natural objects were made 
for a purpose. Among Finnish subjects, the idea that objects such as mountains 
would be purposefully made by some being was only 1% for atheists under 
unspeeded conditions, but it shot up to 23% when they were put under time 
pressure. To compare, Finnish religious participants endorsed ‘made for a 
purpose’ explanations in 25% of trials under unspeeded conditions, going up 
to 41% under time pressure. The idea that God or Gaia made natural objects 
for a purpose is in line with agential beliefs, and stating that these participants 
made a mere mistake means cognitive scientists were straying from the 
methodological boundaries of science. After all, a theist looking at a picture 
of a mountain might think the mountain is there to remind us of God’s majesty. 
In this case, the theist, by her own lights, is not making a mistake. 
Also, note that the mitigating influence of education on teleological 
thinking is a relatively recent phenomenon in Western culture. Until well into 
the nineteenth century, natural theologians and natural philosophers 
encouraged teleological thinking, linking the laws of nature to divine 
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providence and divine design. Paley’s Natural Theology, which explains in 
teleological terms a variety of biological and astronomical features such as the 
function of the swim bladder in fish or the seasons, was a standard textbook 
in British universities during the first half of the nineteenth century.35 
One can reinterpret promiscuous teleology in non-normative, purely 
descriptive terms, perhaps describing it as broad-scope teleology. Normativity 
is superfluous to evaluate empirical claims. It is sufficient to say that 
promiscuously teleological statements such as ‘clouds are for raining’ are at 
odds with Western scientific claims. Promiscuous or broad-scope teleology 
could then be described as the tendency to accept teleological explanations 
that are at odds with Western science, without judgments about their 
appropriateness. 
Greif et al. are sceptical about promiscuous teleology and instead argue that 
people spontaneously apply teleology to artefacts only. Unlike the 
promiscuous teleology research, which pits alternative teleological and non-
teleological explanations of the same event or object against each other, Greif 
et al. gave preschoolers the opportunity to ask open-ended questions about 
unusual-looking artefacts (such as the crullet, which allegedly makes 
playdough balls, or the garflom, which would flatten towels) and unfamiliar 
animals such as the tarsier, saiga, pangolin and civet.36 Children asked about 
the names of artefacts and animals, for example, ‘what is it called?’ However, 
they asked animal-specific questions only for the animals, such as ‘what does 
it eat?’, ‘where does it live?’ and – tellingly –teleological questions only about 
the artefacts, for example, ‘what do people use it for?’ If children were 
genuinely promiscuous in their teleological thinking, one would expect them 
to ask such questions about the animals as well. 
One possible explanation for this anomalous study is that the promiscuous 
teleology studies ask for explanations, whereas the open question design of 
Greif et al. looks at a much larger body of relevant knowledge, including 
ecological features (what an animal might eat and where it might live). When 
children are specifically asked to judge explanations for why particular objects 
or events occur, teleology comes to the foreground. This may be in part 
because mechanistic-causal explanations are more difficult to understand. 
Even for adults, mechanistic-causal knowledge is surprisingly shallow, for 
example, the vast majority of Americans do not know how climate change 
happens.37 Likewise, people think they know how a helicopter, the tides or a 
zipper function, but when asked to explain this in detail they fall short – this 
persistent cognitive bias has been termed the illusion of explanatory depth.38 
When confronted with this lack of mechanistic knowledge, people revert to 
teleological explanations, a cognitive default that is flexibly deployed when 
other explanations are not available or do not seem appropriate. This flexible 
teleological stance also explains why theists and people with Gaia beliefs are 
more likely to endorse teleological explanations, both under speeded and 
unspeeded conditions. They do so because teleological explanations may 
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seem more appropriate or relevant to people who think certain agents (God, 
Gaia) act in the world. 
Promiscuous teleology has further been criticised because it leads to two 
paradoxes. First, cognitive scientists assume that knowledge about the 
differences between animals and artefacts is innate39: grasping this distinction 
comes natural to infants, without instruction or demonstration on the part of 
their parents or the experimenters. Making this distinction is presumably a 
part of ordinary human development. In tension with this claim, promiscuous 
teleology seems to assume that young children are confused about these two 
domains. Second, the promiscuous teleology hypothesis seems to assume that 
western education is the sole means by which people learn to limit teleological 
reasoning to the appropriate domain of artefacts and perhaps parts of 
organisms. But there is significant cross-cultural evidence to show that people 
from non-Western cultures have sophisticated biological knowledge 
(ethnobiology), in some cases better than that of Western laypeople, 
particularly in the domain of ecology.40 For example, Quecha farmers in Peru 
and Bolivia know that rain is important for agriculture. They use the mid-
winter visibility of the Pleiades (June) as a guide for the amount of rain that is 
to be expected during the coming season, and postpone planting if the Pleiades 
are only dimly visible in the night sky. During an El Niño year, cirrus clouds 
are more abundant, which means that fewer stars of the Pleiades are visible.41 
The Quecha then anticipate that rains will come late and be sparse, and thus 
postpone planting potatoes for several weeks. They do not think that the 
Pleiades are ‘for raining’, but use the reliable relationship between star 
visibility and meteorological phenomena (in particular, less precipitation 
during an El Niño year) to guide their agricultural decisions. 
As an alternative to promiscuous teleology, Ojalehto et al. propose what 
they term relational-deictic teleology, which they describe as ‘teleological 
thinking about nature [that] reflects relational reasoning about perspectival 
relations among living things and their environments’.42 This may suggest that 
teleology is not merely an unreflective stance, but that it can be sensibly 
deployed to look at different features of a local ecology. For example, one can 
observe that birds nest in trees. Intuitive teleological reasoning can help us see 
this relationship: the trees are ‘for’ birds to nest in. However, Ojalehto et al. 
did not demonstrate that people do not privilege teleological explanations. 
Rather, they hold that people might think teleologically in different ways, in 
that teleological thinking does not just seem to depend on taking an agential 
perspective. For example, the Nyishi (a North Indian small-scale society) have 
long known that hornbills nest in tree cavities (they traditionally wore cane 
helmets crested with a hornbill beak). From the perspective of a hornbill, tree 
cavities are there to build nests in. Thus, Nyishi think of tree cavities as being 
‘for’ hornbills to build their nests in. This tracks an appropriate ecological 
relationship in teleological terms. Contemporary Western ecologists find such 
teleological reasoning equally useful. For example, increasing traffic and the 
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resulting noise pollution forces Western scrub jays (Aphelocoma californica) 
to leave their native pine tree forests, and this explains why pine trees are no 
longer doing well in California. These birds cache pine seeds for their own 
consumption, but as they forget many cache sites, this behaviour helps pine 
trees to spread.43 For an ecologist, it is useful to teleologically think of these 
birds as fulfilling a valuable ecological function: spreading the seeds of the 
pine trees, even though it is misleading to say scrub jays are there ‘for’ the 
spread of pine seeds. Contrary to what some cognitive scientists argue, namely 
that teleological reasoning is promiscuous, it can be useful for practicing 
scientists in clarifying ecological relationships. 
Thus, taking into account the recent empirical evidence for promiscuous 
teleology and some recent criticisms, we find that teleological reasoning is not 
a passive tendency, but that it can be modulated by a variety of cultural factors 
and beliefs. In this way, teleological reasoning can play a positive role in 
structuring our knowledge about the world, for example, in predictions about 
upcoming precipitation and in elucidating ecological relationships. In the next 
section, we consider Kant’s views on teleology in the third Critique, which we 
draw upon to answer the normative question of whether intuitive teleology is 
promiscuous. 
Kant’s views on teleology 
Kant’s views on teleology can be situated in a historical context of natural 
philosophers trying to make sense of teleology in the absence of Aristotelian 
final causes. Aristotle’s theory of causation was widely used until the late 
Middle Ages to explain adaptiveness in nature. For example, why are our 
incisors suitably shaped to tear food, and why are our molars shaped so as to 
enable us to chew? Aristotle argued that one has to look at the function of 
teeth to understand why this is the case: our teeth were not simply shaped by 
chance, but by their function. Throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages, this 
idea of teleology was widely accepted (see Boulter, this volume). Each object, 
natural or biological, has its own teleology. It is in the teleology of a walnut 
to grow into a nut tree. Not all walnuts grow into trees, but only walnuts (not, 
say, chestnuts) grow into walnut trees, because they have the potential to do 
so. 
In the seventeenth century, Aristotelian final causes were replaced by 
universal laws of nature. Particularly in the domain of physics, authors such 
as Isaac Newton, John Ray and Robert Hooke no longer explained the 
behaviour of objects as a result of their natures and their inherent teleology, 
but rather as a result of general laws of nature that could be indiscriminately 
applied to every object. This mechanistic world view privileged efficient 
causation at the expense of final causation.44 However, the life sciences did 
not, at the time, fit neatly in this picture. How do laws of nature explain that 
poppy seeds grow into poppies, rather than daisies? 
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Natural theology was one solution to make teleology more intelligible: the 
reason that body parts seem so well adapted to fulfil their function, such as 
the eye which seems fit for seeing, is that God designed the world as a 
complex and intricate machine. Authors such as Bernard Nieuwentijdt,45 and 
later William Paley, likened nature to a clock or watch, intricate and well-
designed to fulfil its purpose. The design argument thus served an epistemic 
function, helping natural theologians to make sense of teleology in a world 
without final causes. However, as we have argued elsewhere, there is an 
asymmetry between the design argument and intuitive teleological thinking.46 
Intuitive teleology gives the design argument its appeal, but intuitive teleology 
can survive without the design argument. Even without reference to a divine 
designer, people still discern teleology in nature. Moreover, teleological 
thinking is spontaneous, but inference to a designer is not.47 Further, the link 
between theism and teleology is inconsistent: some studies find increased 
teleology in theists, whereas others do not. 
Outside natural theology, the design argument was deemed problematic 
because it relies on an inductive inference about human-made objects, which 
are designed for a purpose, and natural objects, which, by analogy, presumably 
are also designed for a purpose.48 Moreover, it has a certain circularity, 
because the design argument explains teleology by invoking God (an 
intelligent designer), while arguing for the existence of God on the basis of 
the teleology that is observed. As Kant remarked: 
Thus if we introduce the concept of God into the context of natural science 
in order to make the purposiveness in nature explicable, and then in turn 
use this purposiveness to prove that there is a God, then neither natural 
science nor theology is intrinsically firm; a vicious circle makes both 
uncertain, because they have allowed their boundaries to overlap.49 
There were several alternatives to the design argument to explain teleology in 
nature in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The main theories on offer 
were evolution and epigenesis. (Note that these terms had a different meaning 
to their meaning today.) Evolution and epigenesis were proposed by natural 
philosophers and physicians to explain embryological development. Due to 
the decline of the scholastic view that each kind of object has its own nature 
and propensities, the fact that fern spores grow into ferns could no longer 
simply be explained by final causes (that it is in the nature of fern spores to 
grow into ferns), but had to be explained by reference to general laws. 
Evolutionists such as Jan Swammerdam argued that embryonic development 
occurred because gametes already contained all the information of the adult 
state. By contrast, epigeneticists such as Johann Blumenbach argued that 
embryos are formless, but that their development is guided by a Bildungstrieb, 
a unified biological force that explained phenomena such as regeneration (of 
polyps and other primitive organisms), the repair of wounds and embryonic 
development. Blumenbach emulated Newtonian physics, providing a set of 
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laws that explained how the Bildungstrieb functions, for example, it was 
stronger in younger organisms, and worked with varying degrees on different 
organs.50 
This is the intellectual backdrop for the third Critique. Its second part, the 
Critique of Teleological Judgment, probes whether it is legitimate to think 
about nature in teleological terms. Although Kant was enthusiastic about the 
Newtonian project for physics, he was sceptical of Blumenbach’s theory (with 
which he was familiar)51; he did not think that Newtonian forces could explain 
living things. At best, the Bildungstrieb was a heuristic device.52 
Why do we have this heuristic? According to Kant, ‘Natural purpose is not 
a constitutive concept either of understanding or of reason.’53 In line with the 
work in cognitive science that shows people have a tendency to discern 
teleology in nature, Kant affirmed that we conceive of animals and plants in 
terms of natural purposes because of the way our cognitive faculties work. As 
human beings, given the cognitive capacities we have, we cannot but 
conceptualise living things in teleological terms. We impose teleology on 
nature, even though we shouldn’t.54 
The third Critique argues against the use of teleological principles in 
formulating biological laws which go beyond the use of teleology as a 
heuristic device. Kant thought that natural science could only legitimately use 
mechanistic laws and not teleology. In this he dismissed contemporary 
teleological scientific theories, such as Blumenbach’s, which refer to end-
states to explain how biological forces such as the Bildungstrieb operate. For 
example, to explain embryonic growth or the repair of a wound, one needs to 
make reference to the adult, unblemished state of the organism. While Kant 
recognized the heuristic force of the Bildungstrieb because it used Newtonian 
principles to explain biological phenomena, he also thought that the use of 
teleology to explain mechanical nature was inappropriate. As a result, he 
refused to recognise biology as part of the sciences; it was not a Wissenschaft 
– at most, it was a Naturlehre, a collection of generalisations.55 
Kant’s pessimism about biology is encapsulated in the following statement: 
[W]e may boldly state that it is absurd for human beings even to attempt 
it, or to hope that perhaps some day another Newton might arise who 
would explain to us, in terms of natural laws unordered by any intention, 
how even a mere blade of grass is produced.56 
This statement has received a lot of scrutiny. In particular, the question 
remains whether evolutionary theory would satisfy Kant’s requirements of 
providing an explanation for the apparent teleology in nature without any 
appeal to God, but purely with reference to mechanistic causes. As we have 
seen, a number of contemporary biologists and philosophers of biology talk 
confidently about teleology. While Mayr’s teleonomy does not state that 
organisms are designed, he nevertheless acknowledges features of goal-
directedness in organisms, particularly in adaptive design. In philosophy of 
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biology, neo-teleology has a concept of normative function: the function of a 
heart is to pump blood, and it has acquired this function as a result of its 
evolutionary history. However, there is continued discussion on whether using 
such teleological talk is correct. Cummins argues there is a problem with 
inferring function as a result of past selective pressures.57 We could claim that 
the function of the human hand is to manipulate tools. But at some point in 
our evolutionary history, hominins had hands that were not used to manipulate 
tools, as they had not yet begun to fashion stone tools. The same can be said 
about other examples of adaptations such as wings. The first, rudimentary 
wings in vertebrates did not develop for flying, but likely for capturing small 
prey, leaping and sliding or gliding. Flight developed only later, after the 
evolution of wings.58 
Kant argued that talk about teleology can be a useful heuristic, but can never 
capture real biological properties. His views on teleology as a heuristic can 
also shed light on intuitive teleology, as our concluding section will intimate. 
Conclusion 
Kant’s remarks about teleology and his concept of the transcendental illusion 
provide resources to think about intuitive teleology and its role in human 
cognition. The claim that intuitive teleology is promiscuous is a normative 
claim based on psychological findings. Authors such as Kelemen have argued 
that children and adults without schooling or without access to acquired causal 
mechanistic explanations (due to time pressure or Alzheimer’s) improperly 
attribute teleology to natural kinds, for example, clouds are for raining, 
mountains are for climbing. Such normative claims are problematic because 
one cannot straightforwardly derive a normative claim from descriptive 
psychological results, because this normative claim is not based on 
psychological results, but on a metaphysical framework that goes beyond the 
scope of the sciences: cognitive science cannot adjudicate whether 
supernatural agents exist. At best, one can argue that teleological thinking is 
persistent, occurs for both biological properties and non-biological natural 
kinds and is modulated by education. It appears to be a cognitive default that 
people turn to in the absence of causal mechanistic explanations. Moreover, 
ethnobiology (see third section) shows that teleological thinking can be useful 
and sophisticated. 
Taking a Kantian perspective, one could argue that intuitive teleology 
regulates and structures our cognition by helping us to make sense of 
biological relationships and functions. This is why, unsurprisingly, 
teleological thinking has resurfaced within evolutionary theory in the form of 
adaptive design. For example, eyes evolved across many taxa because it is 
useful for animals, living on a planet with a central light source (the sun), to 
capture light waves that allow them to more easily navigate, hunt prey, evade 
predators and find conspecifics. The statement ‘eyes are for seeing’ helps to 
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capture these adaptations. It also explains why teleology can play a positive 
role in ecology. For example, while the ozone layer is not actually there to 
protect us from harmful UV radiation, it seems intuitive to think that it serves 
this purpose, and the (incorrect) teleological inference ‘the ozone layer exists 
to protect us from harmful UV radiation’ does capture an actual relationship 
between the ozone layer and life on Earth, namely that most life forms on this 
planet could not exist if it were not for the protective effects of the ozone layer. 
To conclude, intuitive teleology is an explanatory default, which plays a 
useful role in cognition, but competes with culturally acquired causal 
mechanistic explanations. Kant believed that teleology had a separate role in 
our cognition, and that it was inevitable, given our cognitive makeup, that we 
would continue to appeal to teleological explanations. Future work on 
teleology could expand this Kantian framework, as outlined in the third 
Critique, by further exploring the positive heuristic role of teleology in 
evolutionary and ecological thinking. 
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